How Iran War Exposed Limits Of Chinese Influence In Middle East

The recent Israel-Iran conflict served as a profound moment of geopolitical clarity, vividly exposing the tangible limits of China’s burgeoning influence in the Middle East and underscoring a persistent power disparity between Beijing and Washington. For years, analysts have meticulously tracked China’s ascent, often portraying it as a peer competitor to the United States across various domains, from high-tech industries and expanding naval fleets to its formidable diplomatic corps. This narrative of a shifting global power balance seemed particularly pertinent in the Middle East, a region traditionally dominated by U.S. influence, especially following Beijing’s successful mediation of diplomatic normalization between Iran and Saudi Arabia two years prior, and the subsequent inclusion of key regional players—Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—into the China-led BRICS bloc.

However, the stark contrast between the United States’ decisive actions and China’s largely rhetorical response during the 12-day Israel-Iran conflict illuminated the enduring gap in global power projection. The United States, standing firmly with its ally Israel, demonstrated formidable military engagement on June 21 by targeting key Iranian nuclear sites with 30,000-pound bunker-buster bombs, culminating in President Donald Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire just two days later, which appears to be holding. Conversely, Beijing’s support for Iran remained predominantly verbal, issuing condemnations of Israel and criticisms of the United States, alongside joint statements with BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization expressing “grave concern” over the attacks violating international law. This divergence underscored Washington’s continued role as the region’s indispensable security guarantor.

The revelation of this power gap is poised to trigger significant geopolitical realignments, with nations potentially gravitating closer into Washington’s orbit or adopting a more neutral stance in the ongoing great power competition between the United States and China. According to Yeh Yao-yuan, a professor of international studies, Middle Eastern countries are likely to shift from a pro-Beijing position, indicating a recalibration of alliances as the world increasingly bifurcates into two distinct camps. Beijing, keenly aware of the U.S. focus on Asia, particularly China, deliberately maintained a low profile during the military escalation. Christopher Balding, a senior fellow at the UK-based Henry Jackson Society, suggests this calculated inaction aimed to divert U.S. attention away from China-centric issues. Internally, China expert Alexander Liao indicates that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is grappling with uncertainty, realizing that its foundational assessment—that the East is rising and the West is declining—no longer holds true, prompting internal debate on potential strategic course corrections.

Central to China’s broader strategic ambitions, Iran holds immense geopolitical value, serving as a critical node in Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and enabling its economy and nuclear program to persist despite decades of U.S. and UN sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran possessed 400 kilograms of enriched uranium just days before the recent conflict. The “comprehensive strategic partnership” forged during Xi Jinping’s 2016 visit culminated in a 25-year agreement in 2021, seeing China commit $400 billion in investments across Iran’s telecom, banking, ports, and other infrastructure, in exchange for guaranteed oil supplies. Today, China procures approximately 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil, with daily volumes reaching about 1.5 million barrels last year. This trade, often conducted in Chinese yuan or through barter to circumvent sanctions, aligns with Beijing’s ambition to de-dollarize global trade and elevate the yuan’s international standing.

Simultaneously, the recent NATO summit in The Hague signaled a robust reaffirmation of Western collective security, with 32 member states agreeing to boost defense spending to 5 percent of their GDPs by 2035, effectively doubling NATO’s military expenditure. This significant increase means NATO members could account for roughly 70 percent of global military spending, up from 55 percent of the current $2.7 trillion total. Beyond fiscal commitments, NATO’s “ironclad” pledge to Article 5 was reinforced, and critically, the alliance released a joint statement with its Indo-Pacific partners—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—declaring the interconnectedness of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. This expanded focus has not gone unnoticed by Beijing, with a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticizing the defense spending hike and NATO’s growing interest in the Asia-Pacific region, underscoring the escalating strategic competition in global geopolitics.

The implications of such a unified, globally oriented security alliance are significant for China. Alexander Liao posits that democracies are “very likely” to expand their regional security alliances to a global scope, a development he considers “lethal” to the Chinese Communist Party, particularly if Article 5-style commitments were to extend to Indo-Pacific nations. Such an expansion would dramatically alter China’s strategic calculus, making its long-held goal of unifying with Taiwan “very challenging,” as any conflict with key regional players like South Korea or Japan would escalate into a confrontation with a formidable bloc controlling the vast majority of global military expenditure. Amy K. Mitchell of Kilo Alpha Strategies also sees “very strong potential” for a NATO-like security alliance in the Indo-Pacific, potentially serving as a significant legacy project for President Trump, whose unpredictability is already seen as a primary deterrent to Beijing.

Adding another layer to the complex Sino-American relationship are the ongoing trade tensions and China’s strategic use of economic leverage. While Beijing announced new controls on two fentanyl precursors, a move aimed at influencing the removal of related U.S. tariffs, the 20 percent fentanyl-related tariff remains part of a cumulative 50 percent tariff on Chinese goods. A consistent point of contention has been China’s slow walk on exporting rare earth elements, which are vital for modern manufacturing and critical military and defense hardware. Despite signing an additional trade agreement, China’s Commerce Ministry stated it would “review and approve eligible export applications” for controlled items, a statement widely interpreted as maintaining tight control over rare earth supply. Christopher Balding suggests China will likely hold even more tightly to its near-monopoly, both to demonstrate economic power and to avoid aiding the U.S. military in an environment of increasing bilateral competition, further highlighting the intricate interplay of economy and geopolitics.